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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Widespread concern over transmission capacity requires theoretical support to infer inadequacy from observed trends indicating reductions in the ratio of transmission to generation capacity over time. If integrated utilities had been regulated with allowed returns exceeding capital costs, transmission generation ratios would have been excessive, and observed trends might be a correction. However, numerous commentators claim that post-restructuring transmission rates have been too low, with NIMBY also discouraging investment. We model the possibility that inadequate separation between generation and transmission may result in reduced investment, in order to preserve incumbent market power in generation. However, consideration of transmission price caps and... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity transmission; Regulation; Deregulation; Vertical integration; Environmental Economics and Policy; L94; L51; L22. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10723 |
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| Selva, Gianluca. |
| Now days in the pig industry as well as in other agro food sectors is the competitiveness that declare the success or failure on the global market. In the case of the pig industry, to be competitive it means to be able to offer a product of higher quality than rivals, but at similar price. The Danish pig industry has reached this level of competitiveness mainly thanks to its forward vertical integrated production chain. This specific coordination, besides than to reduce the transaction costs, push toward a production of excellent quality, that can be promptly adjusted according to the consumers demand. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Competitiveness; Danish pork industry; Vertical integration; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24618 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
| Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that fails to attract non-farm, or "private" investment? We hypothesize that doing so is a costly mechanism for increasing the maximum penalty farmers face in the case of business failure. For a given market environment, exposing farmers to this risk increases the amount of surplus that can be used to repay lenders, thus expanding the set of market environments in which financing is available. We show how equity investment of this sort can be an efficient organizational response to a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate finance; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18610 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
| Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that (apparently) fails to attract non-farm or "private" investment? We hypothesize that farm capital is high cost, relative to that provided by private entrepreneurs (or in other words, that there is a degree of asset fixity in farm capital) but that it engenders greater organizational commitment-which is particularly important when expected market returns are low-on the part of producers. This commitment arises from the indirect incentive properties associated with at-risk capital. We... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate financing; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18478 |
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| Szabo, Gabor G.. |
| Farmers’ problems and co-ordination of agricultural activities cannot be solved simply by EU and/or government support, or by private market co-ordination institutions. Emerging producer groups and co-operatives seem vital in achieving bargaining power. Theoretically, and according to Western European (Dutch, Danish etc.) and US practical experience, one of the major important private institutions that can strengthen producers and help co-ordinate (agricultural) chains is the co-operative entity. To fulfill the basic co-operative aims and to compete in a more market-oriented environment (e.g. more liberal agricultural policies, opening European and world market, etc.) they will initiate new marketing strategies. To implement such new marketing strategies,... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Co-operation; Co-operative identity; Co-operative principles; Strategy; Marketing; Co-ordination; Vertical integration; Agriculture; Farm Management; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/107648 |
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| Mishra, Ashok K.; Erickson, Kenneth W.; Harris, James Michael; Hallahan, Charles B.; Uematsu, Hiroki. |
| This study examines the determinants of income diversification of farm households in the United States. Farm households allocate their time between farm and off-farm activities to help stabilized household income (consumption). What characterizes those households who engage in off-farm activities? Is there any pattern over time? Using 1999, 2003 and 2007 farm-level data from the USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), this study estimates intensity of off-farm income (or income diversification). The results show that older operators, full owners, and small farms have higher intensity of off-farm income in total household income. In contrast, dairy farms, vertically coordinated farms and farms located in the Southern and Pacific regions have... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Tobit; Income diversification; Vertical integration; Tenure; Farm households; Agricultural Finance; Consumer/Household Economics; D1; J2; Q12. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61632 |
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| Ahearn, Mary Clare; Korb, Penelope J.; Banker, David E.. |
| This paper examines the industrialization process of U.S. agriculture by examining the trends in the number of farms, the concentration of production during the last decade, and the dynamics of farm survivability, entry, and exit underlying aggregate statistics. We next examine vertical coordination as part of the industrialization process and highlight contracting in the poultry industry. The analysis provides evidence that production is continuing to be concentrated on a smaller number of farms at a relatively rapid rate, in spite of the stability in the number of farms. Although contracting clearly dominates the broiler industry, it is less prevalent in egg and turkey production, where other forms of vertical coordination are likely established. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Broilers; Contracting; Eggs; Industrialization; Poultry; Structural change; Turkeys; Vertical integration; D23; D40; L11; L14 L22; L23; Q12. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43511 |
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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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